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Socrates: Now call to mind that this is not what 
I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many 
holy acts but to tell the essential aspect, by 
which all holy acts are holy; for you said that 
all unholy acts were unholy and all hoty ones holy 
by one aspect. Or don't you remember? 
Formulation 2.f ~ Method 
In~ Poetic Method 2f Aristotle, Elder Olson begins his 
I 
interpretation of Aristotle's Poetics by quoting a passage from 
A. E. Taylor's Aristotle: 
No especial recognition ••• is given in Aristotle's 
own classification to the Philosophy of Art. Modern 
students of Aristotle have tried to fill in the omis-
sion by adding artistic creation to contemplation e.s 
a third fundamental form of mental activity, and thus 
making a threefold division of Philosophy into Theore-
tical, Practical, and Productive. The object of this 
is to find a ~lace in the classification for Aristotle's 
famous Poetics and his Pshetoric. But the admission of 
the third division of Science has no warrant in the 
text of Aristotle, nor are the Poetics and Rhetoric, 
properly speaking, a contribution to Philosophy. They 
are intended as collections of nractical rules for 
the composition of a pamphlet or a tragedy, not as a 
critical examination of the canons of literary taste.2 
By revealing the Poetics to be a treatise of Aristotelian pro-
ductive science, Elder Olson intends to refute most, if not all, 
o.f the above claims. Presumably, he thinks he can reveal this 
by showing the method~ implicit in the composition, of the 
Poetics to be basically the same as that of productive science 
and of science in general._ This is to say, by revea.ling the 
method of the Poetics to be a snecific application of Aristotle's 
general scientific method: a causal elucidation of the nature 
of a subject and the demonstration of attributes which inhere 
in this subject primarily. If one sees that the Poetics is a 
specific application of Aristotle's general scientific method, 
the conclusion follows that the Poetics must be viewed as having 
the same philosophical stature as Aristotle's theoretical and 
practical writings. 
Elder Olson claims, and this is the primary point around 
which his interpretation turns, that the Poetics must be viewed 
in the light of the whole body of the Aristotelian philosophy, 
that the correct interpretation follows from seeing it in this 
way. Therefore, his procedure is to interpret passages from 
various works where Aristotle s9eaks of things allegedly necessary 
to an understanding of the Poetics, its method of composition 
and purpose for being written. These things, variously found 
in the text of Aristotle, are: 
1. what knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, 
meant for Aristotle 
2. what constitutes science 
3. the general method and aim of science 
4. the division of science into theoretical, practical, 
and productive 
5. the "subject" of productive science 
6. the method and aim of productive science 
These considerations form the first 9art of his essay. Next, 
he considers the Poetics itself as a treatise of productive 
science. And last, he draws conclusions concerning the powers 
and limitations of Aristotle's poetic method for present - day 
writers and critics. 
As Elder Olson relates it, for_ Aristotle there are three 
basic kinds of knowledge - knowledge of facts, knowledge of 
individuals, and knowledge of universals - which vary "according 
to the object of knowledge, the nature of what is lmo"m, the 
faculties involved, and the end of the knowledge. 113 Knowledge 
of universals, however, is rrmch more complicated than the other 
two kinds, for this knowledge enables one to have knowledge of 
a subject plus knowledge of attributes which inhere in the sub-
ject primarily (of necessity).4 
Knowledge of facts is gained through the senses, and all 
animals, since all possess the sense of touch, are able to lrnow 
some facts. Also, those animals, such as man, "with more senses 
have additional channels of information." But knowledge of 
facts, which is "provided by sensation," is by itself "instantial 
only" - "knowledge ••• that this particular flame is hot" 
(as Olson puts it).5 So, at this level of knowledge an animal 
may know such things as red, hot, loud, etc., but these may be 
one time occurrences, if unremembered - that is, if the animal 
hasn't a faculty of memory or this faculty is insufficiently 
developed. The ca:pacity for knowledge at this level might pro-
perly be termed sentience, and creatures fixed at this level 
called sentient creatures.6 
Knowledge of individuals is gained through the memory. Some 
animals have the capacity to recall that something, say, is hot, 
and man, moreover, is capable not merely of sunple~ 
menting present sensation by past (remembering) but 
also of so unifying memory that several memories of 
the same thing have a single effect; this capacity 
Aristotle calls empeiria, experience. 
Where sentience is knowledge of facts, "experience is kn.o·:rledge 
of individuals": "That flame generally is hot" (as Olson puts 
it).7 Individuals are made up of repeatedly remembered and asso-
ciated (unified) facts. And animals fixed at this level of 
knowledge might :pro:perly be called creatures of experience: They 
know enough to come in out of the rain, though they don't know 
what rain is .. 8 
Knowledge of universals is gained through the intuitive 
faculty. This is lrnowledge "of the cause of the fact" - "why 
flame is hot" (as Olson puts it). Science, part of it, is 
knowledge of universals and their causes. This nart of science 
Olson calls "induction," for it proceeds from knowledge of facts 
to knowledge of individuals to the intuitive perception of the 
common causes of individuals which fall under a single universal. 
This part of science proceeds, then, through induction to a 
causal definition of various individuals called by the same name 
("falling under a single universal"). This definition, in turn, 
is the first principle of the science of that universal, but 
the formulation of this principle is only part of this science, 
since 
scientific knowledge is not constituted simply by 
lmowledge of universal 2nd cause. Sensation, ·which 
gives particular information, is not scientific, 
but neither is intuition; if reference of individual 
to universal ~.vere all, intuition ·would be scientific 
knowledge, induction would be the solitary scientific 
process, and science would consist of scientific 
principles only. We moderns tend to classify the 
sciences 2.s inditctive or deductive; Aristotle thought 
that all sciences a.re both, in the sense that prin-
ciples achieved throu~h induction are utilized to 
demonstrate, through causal reasoning, the inherence 
of attributes in a subject. 
Thus, any science is both knowledge of a universal and its 
cause, achieved through induction and intuition, and "knowledge 
of (its) cause(s) as appropriate to ••• the inherence of 
attribute in subject," achieved through deduction (demonstration 
or proof) .9 
Sciences will differ according as inherent attributes, 
subjects, and causes differ, and different "sciences must necess-
arily differ in their principles": the causal definition of 
the universal. But the method of different sciences, in virtue 
of their being science, will in general be the same, since sci-
ence consists of 
principles intuitively derived from experience of 
particulars, and all will be concerned \·ri th proof, 
via cause, of the inherence of attributes in a 
subject • • • 
In specific cases, however, methods will differ - again: "according 
as subjects differ, attributes and proofs of their inherence will 
differ ••• n10 
Having established the nature of science in its inductive -
deductive method and the pur,ose of science in its end, knowledge 
both of what something is and of why it is what it is, Olson 
next claims that "Aristotle divides the sciences into three 
groups, the theoretical, the practical, and the productive, or 
'poetic,' sciences. n11 For the most :pa.rt these groups are dis-
tinguished by their ends.12 The end of theoretical science is 
knowledge; of practical science, action; and of productive science, 
"the uroduct to be prod11ced. 11 Also, in his works Aristotle 
makes many correlative distinctions, such as the 
numerous ones bet·ween "knm·ring, 11 11 doing, 11 and 
"making 11 • • • 1 3 
Particular sciences under the heading of theo·retical are meta-
physics, mathematics, and physics. And those unc9.er the heading 
of practical ar8 ethics and :pr1i tics, 1:rhile thr:>s~ under the 
heading of productive "are the arts, whether useful or fine 
These distinctions made, the next consideration is what the 
• • • 
scone and structure of productive science must be. 
Olson begins this consirl.eration by 2.sking, "In the first 
place, is scientific knowledfZ:e of poetry possible? 11 He re-olies 
.. ' 
n 
Not ••• if it 
the incidental. 
for Aristotle • 
is possible is 
found in which 
dentally.14 
is a matter of the accidental or 
There is no science of the accidental 
• • hence, to ask whether a science 
to ask whether some subject can be 
attributes inhere, and that not acci-
Through some rather involved reasoning, Olson concludes that 
"poetic .science cannot center in the artist" or in the activity 
of -production (the making of the product), so "we are left with 
the product itself as a possible subject. 11 The product, then, 
determines the scope of nroductive science. Also, it determines 
the stru~ture (method), since "all art is concerned with coming 
into being" (making), where 
a form in the mind of the artist is imposed upon his 
medium to produce the artistic composite ••• 15 
of form and matter. Olson illustrates this by citing as an 
example a sculptor who imposes a human form in his mind upon 
marble to create a statue of a human. So, in creating, the 
artist must first reason "from the form to be produced to the 
first thing vrhich can be produced"; then, he must make the 
product according to this reasoning, by starting from the first 
thing and proceeding to the form. Only the reasoning part, 
however, is "in a sense scientific knowledge of the productive 
kind." And since an artist wants to make not only productions 
but "productions excellent of their kind ••• such reasoning 
will have to include not merely the 'nature' of the thing 
intended but its I excellence 1 as ,.-,ell. n 16 
In the conclusion to the first '!)art of his essay, Olson 
g5-ves a summary of the scope of any productive science: It 
is the rational nart of -:-,roduction centering in, and 
indeed based upon, the nature of the product; and the 
structure of such sci??nce may be described as hypothetical 
·•T• 
regressive reasoning, taking for its starting point, 
or principle, the artistic whole which is to be pro-
duced and proceeding through the various parts of the 
various kinds to be assembled ••• Since the reasoning 
is based unon a definition of a certain whole as its 
principle and since that a.efini tion must be arrived at 
in some fashion, any productive science must consist 
of two main ~arts: inductive reasoning toward its 
principle, and deductive reasoning from its principle. 
He next states that "the Poetics clearly follows this general 
pattern" (is a treatise of Aristotle's productive science): 
Chapters i - v are concerned with establishing the 
definition of tragedy (induction), which is given 
in chapter vi; chapters vi - xxii resolve tragedy 
into its proper parts (deduction) ••• 
• • 
Moreover, Olson thinks the conclusion necessarily follows that 
the definition on which everything centers is no mere 
statement of the neaning of a term or name, as ':Te 
ordinarily think of definition nowadays; it is a state-
ment of the nature of a whole produced by a certain art; 
and it is introduced, not merely to clarify meanings a 
little but much more importantly, to serve as the princinle 
of the art and hence as the basis of all reasoning. 1 7, 18 
Criticism 
If the point of Olson's interpretation were only to refute 
the claims of A. E. Taylo:r;, given the cogency of his account of 
Aristotle's method, this reader thinks that the point has been 
achieved. With good assurance of being cqrrect, one could claim 
that Aristotle's intention in writing the Poetics was to give a 
rational account of the art 9f writing tragedy, not merely to 
provide a book of practical rules, and that this account is 
comparable in philosophical stature, in virtue of common method 
and intention, to Aristotle's theoretical and practical writingse 
However, Olson claims much more; refutation is merely the spring-
board. Not only 1 does he claim to have ,inteJ'.'.'Preted correctly what 
Aristotle said, but also he claims, both i~plicitly and expli-
citly in his presentation, that .,..,hat Aristotle said is correct, 
or true. Olson is a modern day proponent of·Aristotle's method 
and do.ctrine. This means, I take it, that he would proceed in 
much the same way as Aristotle in answering the question, What 
is tragedy? - or the question, a corollary determination, whether 
an individual play - let us say, The Father, by August Strindberg -
is a tragedy. For myself at least, this procedure and the doc-
trine uuon ,.,,,hich it is based nresent three kinds of difficul tie·s, 
those concerning 
1. the coherence of Olson's account of the general induc-
tive - deductive met'hod of science, as presented 
2. the re1ation of the purnorted inductive - deductive 
·method of the Poetics to the general method of 
· science, as presented 
3. the co~clusions believed to follow from the pre-
sentation. 
Problems of ·the sort in two and.three stem from those in one. 19 
To begin, though Olson fails to mention this, kinds of 
knowledge are differentiated in Aristotle according·to their 
causes - material, efficient, formal, and final - as follows:20 
Purpose? Material Efficient Formal Final 
1 •. K. of facts facts senses sensations movement? 
2. K. of individuals individuals memory :perceptions? action? 
3.K.of universals universals intuition conceptions? theor,.r? 
Knowledge Object of K. Faculty Nature of ·what End 
is known 
But this table.is misleading because what is being characterized 
is dynamic in man, rather than static. Though anima~s, including. 
individual men, get stuck at any one of these levels - one, two, 
or three - some men have the capacity to function on all three 
-levels. This. is to say.that some men have the :potenti~l to acquire 
knowledge at one level and move on to the next, until they have 
acquired universal knowledg~ and·the truths derivable from the 
knowledge ~f universals. Since the means of acquiring knowledge 
, 
and of moving from one level to the next are certain faculties, 
this account of how men acquire knowledge is psychological. Also, 
in the dynamic account, knowledge of individuals may be plugged 
in as the material cause of knowledge of uni,rersals; likewise 
knowledge of facts may be :pluggecl. in as the mat~rial cause of 
knowlede;e of individuals. This means that knowledge of universals 
is acquired through knowledge of individuals, "in some fashion," 
this knowledge reflecting (corres~onding to) the relation of 
individual to universal in reality; likewise for knowledge of 
individuals acquired through knowledge of facts, this knowledge 
reflects the relation of fact to individual in reality. This is 
to say that knowledge of facts, individuals,· and universals 
comes from sense-experience, is effected through certain faculties, 
and contains certain ends. 
The trouble with the above account, whether one sees the 
account as static or dynamic, is that a clear account of causes 
is not given. How does one acquire knowledge of causes? Are 
they induced through experience, deduced in a theory, or intuited? 
If induced, then there must be four :primary kinds of knowledge: 
of facts, individuals, universals, and causes. But we are told 
that scientific knowledge is knowledge of the cause of the fact. 
Therefore, having scientific knowledge of causes - wher·2 causes 
have a status conparable to that of facts, individuals, and uni-
versals - would entail giving the causes of the cause, but this 
would lead to an infinite regress. Possibly, one may get around 
this by saying that knowledge of universals is know·ledge of the 
cause of the fact, as above, but meaning by this that causes 
are "seen" at the level of inti..1.ition only, and thereby preserving 
the three :primary kinds of knowledge. But even saying this, the 
status of causes remains mysterious. Moreover, if causality 
makes its appearance only at the intuitive level, knowledge of 
facts will be a fact and knOi·!ledge of individuals an indi vj_dual, 
since these are respect; Yely dist:i_nguished as kinds of knowledge 
through their causes. At this point, it becomes extremely diffi-
cult to distj_nguish knowledge of universals from knowledge of 
facts or knowledge of individuals. The concepts get confused. 
In the foregoing I have intended to point out that the 
psychological account of how we acquire knowledge breaks down 
when it comes to accounting for knowledge of universals. As 
related, the way we acquire knowledge is a kind of natural process, 
natural in virtue of our being men.rather than a lower form of 
animal: sensations give rise to ~erceptions which give rise to 
intuitions (conceptions?). But, the way it is told, the passage 
from sensation to perception (or exuerience or knowled[:e of 
individuals) takes nlace as a matter of course; whereas that 
from perceptjon to intuition does not - a question must be asked, 
Why? - why not? Further, this whole account of how v,.re acqu.:'Lre 
knowledge becomes confused when Olson states that a man may 
''have theory without experience" or experience without theory. 
The reason for his saying this is obvious enough. Often, 
when a man is asked to give an account of how he did something, 
how he Wl!ote a t~agedy for ins+.ance, he is unable to do so; on 
the other hand, another ·man may be able to account fo:r why a 
21 rp., play is a tragedy, but be unable to ,:rri te a tragedy. :l:ne first 
man would be a man of experience without theory; the second, a, 
man of science without experi.ence. But, to recognize that men 
differ in these respects is one thing; to account for these 
differences through th~ presentation of a psychological account 
of how we acouire knowledge quite another - es-pecially if the 
coherence of such an account depends upon such differences not 
occurring. Olson contradicts himself when he triAs to account 
for differences between men, while,at th~ same time, he tries 
to be consistent in his account of how men ac~uire knowledge: 
-12-
~~science~, strictly speakinR," nroduced 
.2J!!_Qf e'X'T:'erience, rather than identical with it. 
For experience is knowledge· of individuals, while 
-art and science are knowledge of universals, and 
al though in reference to action and nrod1 ction • • • 
men of exoerience alone succeed better than those 
~ ~ theorv without exnerience, experience :pro-
vides knowledr:e of the fact, but not of the cause 
of the fact, whereas artistic and scientific 
knowledge is of the cause. (Italics miD:e)22 
In one breath Olson says that theory (art and science) is 
produced out of experience; in the next he says that a man 
may have theory without experience. This contradiction is 
both a manifestation of a confusion which persists throughout 
Olson's interpretation and an index to seeing the interpreta-
tion aright.23 For instance, it will--not do to tag the process 
-froIJ). sensation to percep;tion to intuition, 11 induction," when 
part of the process may drop out: A man may "have theory with-
out experience." Sine~ "to have experience 0 means that one 
thinks he is able to do certain things (write tragedies for 
instance), to say that "science {is) ••.• _ produced out of 
expe1:9ience 11 should mean·that·the scientist is able to do these 
same things and more, to tell why he is able to do -them. The 
same goes for the artist: He doesn't make mistakes. However, 
this is not the case,-either as Olson relates it or as one's 
experience :of sci.entists and artists would i~dicate. Why :Q.ot? 
If Aristotelian science is not based upon experience, upon what 
is it based? 
Nor, as another instance, will it do to.base the rationale 
of productive science upon ,,,hat takes place in the mind of the 
artist in the process of production, since this begs the question 
whether the artist is a man of experience without theory (a.nd he 
-,..; .. 
shouldn't be) or a man of science with experience (who hap:oens 
also to be possessed of experience). One does not say, therefore, 
that the rationale of productive science is the same as what 
takes place (the reasoning) in the mind of t:he artist during 
creation (can one see, or experience, what is taking place there?); 
but, given this rationale, one says that c2rtain things, conscious 
or unconscious, must take place in the mind of the artist if he 
is to produce works of art. Again, upon what is productive science 
based, if not u:9on experience? 
The question is: given that men are basically the same, in 
virtue of possessing the same facul t::.es and having access to the 
same facts, individuals, and universals, how is it that they come 
to differ? - some men, so the account goes, being 
1. men of experience without theory 
2. others, r:ien of experience with theory 
3. still others, men of science without experience 
4. and yet others, men neither of science nor experience 
One may say, "Well some men·have bad memories, or they count 
some things to be facts 1,vhich aren't f3.cts 2t all, or their 
intuitions are mistaken; and this accounts f0r the differences 
among ·men.:" But then, what sense is there in givi.ng a psycho;,. 
log~_cal account of how we ac0uire knowledge, since something 
more must be added to ensure that one is indeed acquiring knowledge 
and not the illusion of knowledge. 
The way Olson relates it, men c cq_qi.re knowledge more or 
less as a matter of course, naturally, in virtue of being men 
rather than some lower form of ar.imal; anrl he dubs this natrral 
process "induction." The next step is to be.se the genere.l 
-14-
' inductive method of science, the induction of universals from 
particulars, u~on what happens naturally anyway. But by reminding 
oneself of the differences among men, one sees that, rather than 
being psychological, this account is c~nceptual. In the account 
the scientific method is already at work. which is to say that 
Olson contradicts himself.because of conceptual confusion; science 
arises not out of experience, as he relates it, for a man of 
experience seemingly ,,,ould feel no need of science, but for other 
reasons and in virtue of a method. 
What are the reasons for, and method of, science? Science, 
Olson tells us, is concerned, .not with "the accidental or the 
incidental," but 
·• ·• • with what happens always or for the most part, 
,with what is necessary or probable; hence, to ask 
whether a science is uossible is to ask whether some 
subject can be found ·1~4which attributes inhere, and that not accidentally. 
He goes on to say that such a subject, where productive science 
is concerned, is "the product to be produced. 1125 But how do.es 
this "fact 11 about science relate to the psychological {in 
reality, conceptual) . account of how we acquire knovlledge? The 
way I see it is this: Men of experience, possessed of knowledge 
of individuals, are able to do certain things, but they may make 
mistakes because they 9_lace too much emphasis on the ·wrong things. 
For instance, a man of experience who knows what tragedy is in 
' terms of its individuality will be able to write a tragedy; 
' perhaps a good one, but he will also be capable of writing a 
I 
bad tragedy or what·he thinks will be a tragedy which, when written, 
turns out to be :ri.o tragedy at· all. A ma.l"J. of experience alone 
is unable to distinguish attributes necessary to, :from those 
incidental to, a play 1 s being a tragedy. Science, through 
its method, seeks to ensure that the man of experience will 
not make such ~istal,ces. In this res~ect, science seeks to 
augment ex:9erience; it is involved in a quest for certainty; 
and it proceeds by distinguishing the necessai'1J in experience 
from the accidenta1.26 · 
The conclusion follov1s that science, or the auest for 
scientific knowledge (certainty), arose for this reason: Men 
began to doubt that experience provided an adequate basis for 
a man's spying that he knows what something is and for his 
being correct in saying this. The question is, Why did men 
begin so to doubt experience?27 
So experience, so far from being a uart of science, in 
the sense that science is produced out of it through some kind 
of psychological inc'l.uct±ve process,·· is opposed to science. 
This is another way of saying.that causes are not induced; if 
they were, the man of experience would have universal knowledge; 
but the man of science, conc_erned with the causes of things, is 
ih onposi tion (so far as claims to knm·rledge go) to the man of 
experience, whose concern is doing (making) things. Crucial, 
then, to an understanding of how scientists distingu.ish necessary 
from accidental attributes - sup-posing this ca..11. be done - is an 
understanding of the method by which th~y seek to do this; and 
crucial to 2.n und.erstand:i.ng of this method· is a grasp both of 
the c:,uestion the sciEmtist 2sks, the reason. for his asking it, 
and of the social context in which it is asl,ced. 
As Olson relates it, the scientific method consists in deter-
mining the causes of what a thing is; and this method is :preceded 
.,,o-
by asking, "Why is this thing what it is?'~ Where an elucidation 
of the nature of tragedy is the concern, the correlative question 
and method of productive.science are. to ask "Why is this tragedy 
a tragedy?" and to ascertain the causes of tragedy. Giving the 
causes of tragedy, it is claimed, definitively ans·we~s the ques-
. . . 
tion, and from this definition, or principle~ one may demonstrate 
by reasoning from the causes the adherence of necessarr attributes 
in tragedy. From this it is clear.that when Olson says "subject" 
or "product," in this instance, he means to say "tragedy11 ; 
tragedy, he believes, is a proper subject of productive science. 
This is to say that tragedy is "found" by the scientist to be a 
subject of the required sort for scientific interest - a "whole," 
that is, possessed of necessary attributes causally relate~, but 
. 
distinct from individual tragedies. These partake of the tragic 
nature, essentially, and so are distinguished as tragedy, but 
each is possessed also of accidental attributes which make it 
the individual tragedy that it is. 
Indeed, when one inspects the "inductive" T)art of the·E,QP.tics,, 
one sees th~t it consists.of Aristotle's differentiating. tragedy 
from epic and comedy through the method of the four causes. Here 
there is no extensive comparison a.nd contrast of individual 
tragedies; with the view of determining co:mmon ca.use, that would 
warrant the phrase, "inducing from particulars"; rather, such 
an extensive procedure, which might be comparable to modern 
science's inductive nethod, is totally neglected. We are given 
inste2.d a technical :9rocedure _characterized by "the answers we 
give to the question, Why is this tragedy, a tragedy'?" - "because 
it imitates a certain object, in a certain manner, through a 
-, ,-
certain medium 11 28 - because, that is, it has a certain formal, 
a certain efficient, and a certain material cause. These three 
causes, ":re are +old, are enough to differentj_ate tragedy from 
epic and comedy, but tragedy is distinguished as a form of art 
by its final cause ::rhich has historically undergone a series of 
progressive changes. So, having distinguished tragedy from 
other forms of art by its serious action, dramatic manner, and 
poetic medium, Aristotle then gives an account of the successive 
final causes through which tragedy has gone, these being: to 
give pleasure, to instruct morally, and to be written as an end 
in itself. These Olson calls, respectively, the hedonistic, 
ethical, and artistic final causes .. of tragedy. Having dis-
tinguished tragedy =rom other forms of art and as a form of art 
itself, Aristotle then collects the four causes in the form of 
a definition of tragedy. 
****** 
From what has been said, the following elucidations may be 
made: 
1. The scientific method is already at ·work in Olson's 
psychological account of how we acquire knowledge. This is to 
say that the account is concentual, rather than psychological. 
To say, by giving the four caus"'·S of kno1:.rledge of facts, that 
one has kno·.,,ledge of facts is to define, through the method of 
the four causes, what is to count as a fact. A fact is some-
thing in the external world (material cause), grasped by the 
senses (efficient cause) in the form of a sensat1on (formal 
cause), a.'t'J.d effecting certain mov"?men-::.s (final cause) of a -physical 
nature. The same goes for individuals and universals. An indi-
vidual is something in. the externai world, grasped by the memory 
in the form of a perception, and effecting certain activities of 
~ physical - ~ntellectual nature; whereas, a universal is some-
thing in the external world, grasped by intuition in the forn of 
a conception, and effecting certain reasonings (mental activities) 
of a theoretical nature. Thus, to have knowledge of facts, indi-
viduals, and universals is to ·define them in the same way that 
tragedy is defined: through the method of the four causes. 
Clearly, to say that knowledge of universals is lmowledge of the 
cause of the fact is not only confusing, but redundant. One should 
say; Knowledge of the universal, hotness, ~hich is clearly a fact 
as facts are defined, is knowledge of the causes of hotness. 
However, from the above it is not clear, as yet, upon~ consid-
erations~ defining activitv 1.§. based. 
2. It will not do to say that sensation provides knowledge 
of ~acts, since creatures at ~he sentient level have no knowledge 
of the causes of facts. Scientists have knowledge of causes. 
One must say that sensations correspond to facts, but only the 
scientist knows what the fact is; likewise, for men of experience, 
perceptions correspond to individuals, but only the scientist 
knows what the individual is. 
3. The point of saying that men of experience have knowledge 
of individuals is to provide a foil for men of science ~·.,ho seek 
knowledge of universals. The point is the same as that of the 
following dialogue: 
Scientist: Tell I:1e, tragedian, 'db.at is tragedy? Tell 
me this, if you will, that I Mi,'?;ht know ~ .. ,hen I see a 
play whether it is a tragedy or not. 
Tragedian: Why gladly, man of science, what you ask 
of me is easy. The M;amernnon, King ~' and, let us 
say,~ OediDus 2f. Seneca are all tragedies. 
"When asked what something is, the man of exnerience noints to 
individuals; that is what it means to say that· he he,s knowledge 
of individuals. 
4. The conceptual difference (so far as claims to know-
ledge go) between the man of experience and the man of science 
may be seen if the dialogue is contj_nued: 
Scientist: But this is not what I meant in asking 
you what tragedy is: to give me a list of plays 
which, in :e 7 our ouinion, are tragedies. PA.+,::ier, I 
want you to tell me what the essential form of 
tragedy is which makes all t'!'agic plays tragic. 
Do you ~gree, or not, that all tragic plays, the 
ones you mentioned included, if they are tragedies, 
are tragic in virtue of a conrnon fonn. 
Tragedian: I see. Yes, I agree that it must be so. 
Scientist: Well, then, tell me what precisely, this 
ideal is, so that, with my eye on it, and using it as 
a standard, I can say that any play 1-vri tten b:v yon or 
anyboiy else is tragic if it rese~bles this ideal, or, 
if it does not, can deny that it is tr2gic. 
It does not occur to the ma..Yl. of experience that he shon1d first 
discover (find, define) the common form of all tragic pl2.ys in 
order to ensure that, when he says some individual :9lay is a 
tragedy, he will be correct in saying this. Yet, when the 
scientist points this out to him, he agrees - it occurs to him 
that this must be the c2.se - and he may even sa" 7 , 11 Ifow I see that 
all the plays which I have heretofore called 'traa.-edies' must 
have a common form." Probably, at this time, it also occurs to 
him that he must already know what the common form is. \·Jh:r? -
because he has been speaking a lan.<_',"Uage for some time prj_or to 
these occurrences. 
5. Knowing what the common form of tragedy is cannot be 
based on knmving that an individual play, or a collection of 
plays, is a tragedy. It is the other way around. This is to 
say that the form which the enquiry takes throws into doubt the 
correctness (truth) of all prev:i.ous assertions regarding indi-
viduals. Therefore, the correctn~ss of the a.ssert~_on, "all the 
plays which I have heretofore called 'tragedies'have a common 
form," cannot be based on the correctness of the assertion, "This 
play, or this collection .of plays, is a tragedy". Science can-
not be based upon experience since, if it were, it would be 
subject to the same doubt (whatever the nature of this doubt 
might be) that experience is subject to. 
6. Between the man of exoerience and the mRn of science 
exists an unbridgeable gap, characterized by doubt, a auest for 
certainty, and a ouestioning attitude. One may say of the former 
that his pointing to individual -rlays and calling them "tragedies" 
indicates that he recognizes what the common form is, th6ugh 
he hasn't had occasion to doubt and want to knm.,, what this common 
form is, and that, given such a.'1. occasion and the consequent 
articulation (envisioning) of the form, he (as a man of science) 
will be able to .say (tell) which of his previous assertions 
were correct. While of the latter, the scientist or man in doubt, 
one ma~r say • • • ? 
?. Supposedly, the correct procedure, as I understand it, 
is this: One first defines what tragedy is, notices that a play 
conforms to or cl9sely resembles this definition, and. then makes 
the correct assertion, "This play is a tragedy. 11 Also, from the 
definition on9 may deduce necessary attributes. Still, it is 
difficult to see on what such a definition will be based, if 
not on a collection of plays knmm. (recognized) to be tragedies. 
8. The scientist must make a distinction between knowing 
and recognizing a form (essence, necessary qualities or features). 
If his activity is to make sense, this distinction must be 
meaningful: Recognition of a form means that it is seen but not 
understood, while knowledge of a form means that it is both seen 
and understood. Further, to say that a form is seen but not 
understood is to say that it is understandable; to say that a 
form is both seen and understood is to say that it is intelli-
gible. Granted these distinctions, one may say of the man of 
experience that he confuses the feeling that a form is under-
standable with a..~ understanding of it. He recogni~es ~he common 
forms of things - his usage of the_ same word to refer to many 
things is evidence of this - but, when asked to do so, he is unable 
to pick out what the coIP.mon form is. He lacks a method of doing 
this. Rather, wheri asked, "What is tragedy?", the man of ex.9erience 
points to an individual. His 9ointing to an individual in answer 
to this ouestion indicates that he has confused the recognition 
of a form with an understanding of it. 
9. The method of the four causes is employed by the 
scientist to -oick out the comr,:on forms of things. It is clear 
that this method is based ·x·'.1on an ass1i.m-otion about how language 
gets its mee..ning, rather than upon some :9s~rchological inductive 
process. This assumption is that the meaning of a word is t~e 
object to which the W'.)rd refers; and, ·.·:here many things (indi-
viduals) are cEdled by the same name (gen2ral word), they are 
called so in v:· rtue of a cor:imon :form to which the nane refers. 
When one wants to pick out the common form, however, one needs 
a method to do this - a method of distinguishing the common 
form both from attributes peculiar to the individuals and from 
other forms. Unless the common form of many things called by 
the same name is distinguished, one may make mistakes either in 
referring to individuals or in trying to make, do, or know indi-
vidual things. ·with reference to tragedy, then, the need of a 
method of definition arises when one recognizes that "tragedy" is 
a word, as opposed to mere babble, but is unable to nick out that 
to which the word "tragedy" refers - the assumption being that 
the meaning of a word is the object to which the word refers. 
10. It is clear that the method of the four causes, as 
Olson describes it in relation to tragedy, is based in part, not 
unon an induction from particulars, but upon the recognition of 
"tragedy" as a word.29 This recognition is enough to ensure that 
tragedy is a subject, or product, of the desired sort for scien-
tific interest, i.e. a subject "in which attributes inhere, and 
that not accidentally." One may mistakenly use this word.- say 
- that a particular play is a tragedy, where it is not - but usage 
of the word, whether correct or mistaken,. is irrelevant to the 
method of definition. Rather, since "tragedy" is recognizably 
a word, there must be (or have been) correct usages of the word -
plays of which it is correct to say that they are tragedies -
and one of the purposes of the method is to obviate mistaken 
usages by showing which will be correct. The method of definition 
does not rest then on a collection of (one or many) plays known 
to be tragedies, but the defining activity ~resu~poses that such 
a collection might be known. 
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11. The method of definition must rest on a collection of 
plays recognized to be tragedies, but does not preclude the 
possibility that members of the collection might not belong to 
it. If this is not the case, the defining activity is absurd. 
As described, this method consists in causally distinguishing 
tragedy from epic and comedy, and as a form of art itself. 
12. · The question persists: Upon what considerations is 
this causal· determination based? And further, what makes it 
definitive? And furthermore, why not call it the method of 
the four \vbys, Reasons, Answers, or Responses we give to the 
question, "W'ny is this thing the thing that it is, if it is this 
thing?i' 
***** 
This "poetic.method," mysterious as it is, Olson claims 
to be the true one so far as "mimetic" art is concerned. And 
the method becomes even more mysterious when he claims: 
Aristotle was not concerned with everything which 
we should call poetry, and aJ..so he W? s concerned 
.with so!Tle things that we should no long~r call "90etry. 
It will not do even.to say that he was concerned 
with tragedy, epic, or comedy, for the significance 
of these terms has altered since his day. He thought •••. 
of tragedy as ~oetry similar to the Oedinus of 
Sophocl0s, not to the Oedinus of Seneca or The White Devil.' · 
When the method is the true one, but the definition non which 
everything centers" changes, this reader wonders at the intelli-
gibility of what is being said. 
If Aristotle's method only enabled him to define Greek 
tragedy, not the tragedy of Senaca, h01.·r will his definition help 
me to see whether any particular play (let us say, .. ~ Fe.th er) 
is a tragedy? P.1n I to employ the method only, and ignore the 
definition? But the employment of the method is contingent 
u:pon my recognizing not only a collection of plays as. 
tragedies - if asked, I would. be inclined to say, "Yes, that 
play is a tragedy 11 - but also a collection of plays as comedies, 
etc. The problem is: 1dhat if I were inclined to say that the 
Oedi nus of Seneca, the Agamemnon, 8.nd say King Lear are all 
tragedies? How am I to restrict my recognition to col:1_ections 
of plays, for each of which the significance of the corresponding 
term is the same? 2f cours2_, ~ definition tells~~--
The question is: Is·to say that there are such things as 
forms of art to say that all art works called by the same name 
have the same form? Olson wc1.nts to say 11yes II and "no" to this 
question. He answers "no," since he says that th~ Oo,d.;pus of' 
S2-n.ec8. arrl the Ueo i 0us of Sonhocle s are both called "tragedies, 11 
but are different forms of tragedy. He answers "yes," since 
he claims that, 
as new forms of mi"'etic art emerge, th': theor:r c2.n be 
extended to cover them as well - urovided +hat the 
extensj_on is 1?Y one v.rho has suffi9ient knowledg~ of 
and skill in Aristotle's method.5 
So, tragedy is a form of art, but the signific::ince of "tragedy" 
may change; that is, tragedy ma.y 11 emerge ii as a new form of art 
( in different perj_ods or cultures, I supnose, since Olson 
contrasts the tragedy of Seneca with that of Sophocles). But, 
this description of the state of affairs leads inevitably to the 
(!uestion: How is one to distinguish a form of art from snecific 
works of art? 
------
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The very basis of the method is the assumption that all 
things called by the same name have something in common (be it 
nature, form, common attributes or features) in virtue of which 
they are so called. When this correspondence of name and sig-
nificance is undermined, the subject matter of productive science 
-is threatened with disappearance. For 'instance, one may consider 
both the Aga~emnon of Aeschylus a...~d the Oedipus of Sophocles to 
· be tragedies, and yet question whether they have a common form. 
(As presented, Aristotle would not have raised this question. 
He would have said, "If they are called 'tragedy,' then they~ 
have a corn.man form.") Such questioning leads inevitably to the 
consideration that Aristotle, rather than defining tragedy or, 
for that matter, Greek tragedy, may have only defined the tragic 
nature of a specific work (let us say, the Oediuu.s of Sophocles) .. 
This "definition" was seen by Aristotle to be the norm o;r- :paradigm 
of good tragedy, or, as we may see it, of Greek tragedy alone. 
In conclusion, the picture I get here of Aristotle is that 
of a man pointing - at something? 
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Summary 
Olson's account of a true poetic method is incoherent for 
the following reasons • 
. 1. His psychological account of how men acquire knowledge 
is marred by an equivocal, if not contradictory, usage of the 
word "knowledge." Olson says that all sentient creatures possess 
knowledge of at least some facts, and that men of experience 
possess knowledge of individuals. By definition, however, the 
scientist is the only person who might possess knowledge, since 
he is concerned with the causes of things. According to Olson 
himself, "to possess knowledge of a thing" means to articulate 
the four causes of a thing. 
2. The suggestion that the man of experience already knows, 
prior to the intuition of causes, what an individual is leads one 
to think that the inductive method of science is a merely routine 
procedure of gathering together individuals already kno~m through 
sense-experience, and of intuiting the four causes (the form which 
these individuals have in common) from this collection of indi-
viduals. However, if such a proc~dure does characterize the 
inductive part of science, there is no evidence of the procedure 
in what Olson claims to be the inductive part of the Poetics. 
Of course, one might claim that Aristotle merely failed to mention, 
an oversight on his part, the collection of rlays from which he 
drew his definitions of t;re.gedy, comedy, and epic. In any event, 
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since the procedure presupposes that one already knows what the 
individuals are - that The Father is a tragedy, that The Ag-ameri.non 
is a tragedy, etc. - it is difficult to see how the procedure 
and the resultant definition are to be of any use in coming 12_ 
~ whether any play fresh off the -oress is a tragedy. Even if 
Olson's account of a true -poetic method were coherent, the defin-
ition arrived at would lack the flexibility required to handle 
borderline cases, those instances where the question arises: Is 
this play a tragedy? Indeed, that this question might be asked 
at all strikes right at the foundation of Olson's method of 
definition, the notion that a definition of tragedy might be 
drawn or intuited from a collection of plays, since the plays of 
which the question is asked, the borderline cases, are ones 
where men have failed to find agreement. This is to say that 
the notion of a collection of plays from which the definition 
of tragedy is to be drawn presupposes a consensus of opinion as 
to what plays are to be included in the collection. It is not 
a matter of one man's choice. 
3. Though it will not do for Olson to say that e:x:perience 
provides knowledge of individuals, he uses the word 11 experience 11 
in quite another sense in his account. In this usage "experie:i1ce" 
means capacity to do or to make. The man of experience has the 
capacity to ,'ITite a tragedy. Of course, since he lacks precise 
knowledge of what it is that he is writing, the man of e:x:perience 
sometimes realizes his capacities and sometimes does not. So, 
apart fron. Olson's shaky usage of the wo:i::-d "knowledge," he 
suggests that the intuition of c~uses is the end result of a 
causal chain of sense-ex9er5_ence, where "exnerience II is to· be 
-------- :.2a~--
understood in the above sense. The scientist should be able not 
only to define tragedy, but to write one as well. 
4. Olson's account of how men acquire knowledge through 
some kind of psychological.~ inductive urocess is doomed inher-
ently to self-destruction precisely because of the presuppositions 
underlying his nethod of defining universals. That causes are 
seen at the level of intuition and that only scientists are con-
cerned with causes are presuppositions of Olson's method of 
definition, yet facts, individuals, and universals are. all defined 
according to their causes. This means that both facts and indi-
viduals are universals, since by definition universal·s are con-
ceived at the level of intuition - the same level at which causes 
are intuited. Clearly, to say that one gains knowledge of facts 
through the senses or knowle~ge of individuals through the memory 
contradicts the fact that facts and individuals are conceived 
through the intuitive faculty. Olson's psychological account, 
therefore, has no bearing at all on his method of definition. 
In this paper my conc~rn has been to lead the investigation 
out o:f the back alleyways of faculty psychology into a world 
where men talk, some of them poetically, to one another. In 
claiming that Olson's account is conceptual, my intention has 
been to show both where the not~on of forms first entered into 
human discourse 2.nd what the picture of language, underlying the 
notion, is: the nicture of language as a naming activity. This 
picture dictates two assumptions e.bout language: 
1. When :'lany +hin:-;s ?..:!"e called by the same name, they 
are called ~o ~_n virtue of a coII1.mon form to which 
the name :!'efers. 
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2. The meaning of a word is the object {form) to which 
the word refers. 
The method of the four causes is presented as a means of picking 
out these forrr..s, of defining the meanings of words. 
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Literature, ed. by Elder Olson (Chicago, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1965), p. 176. 
4rt is not clear whether a subject is the same as a 
universal. 
501son, Aristotle's Poetics, p. 176. 
6rs the fla~e a fact? or its hotness? or both? Does it 
make sense to say that lmowled.ge of facts is, for example, 
knowledge that this particular hotness is a flame or that this 
hotness is a particular flame? OlsonJs way of talking here 
is confusing to say the least. On the analogy of tragedy, 
which he gives.later, the questions one may ask are: 
(a) Why is this flame hot?: v'ihy is this tragedy tragic? 
(b) W'ny is this fla!ne a flame?: ·1tn1y is this tragedy a tre,gedy? 
(c) Why is this hotness hot?: 1vby is this tragic(ness) tragic? 
But (a) does not fit, since giving the four causes of hotness 
does not define the essential nature of flame, but of hotness 
(or heat). Is the question, )'/hy is this flame hot?, at all 
comparable to the ci.uestion, V,hy is this tra5edy tragic?, or to 
the question, T,fuy is this pot-bellied stove hot? I think that 
Olson should say h2re, in ord9r to be consistent, that our senses 
give us ci:.:>rt2.in kinds of .i..nforTJation about the world (not, surely, 
that th12re 2.re flames out there) on the analogy of a':108b8.s, snr1ils, 
and dogfishes. For instance, infornation Fl.bout 1 otness, J_oudnef:s, 
redness. A dogfish, for example, placed in close proxi~ity to a 
flame might feel. the heat. This would be evidenced by its flip-
flopping to get e;way_ from· it. But would it see a flame, or a 
brightness? At this level of knowledge, the abi1ity to tell (say) 
what is out there does not enter in; rat.her, one reacts in 
certain ways. Sensation, then, pr".'lvides kno\•rlea.ge of facts, or 
qualitjes. At the sentient level, to say that one has knowledge 
of facts is to say that one reacts in certain ways. 
701son, Aristotle's Poetics, :g. 176. 
8It iR dif'.ficult to understand what is being said here, in 
. . 
the eq_uation of knowledge of individuals with knmvledge that flame 
generally is hot (as an exam:ple). It is not clear how facts are 
to be distinguished from individuals. Why does it sound funny to 
say that the knowledge that hotness generally is flame is knm·rledge 
of an individual (hotness)? On the·analogy of an a:pe: Where does 
the notion of a banana enter in when all the ape sees is yellow-
ness with black strines in a field of green? He is able to~ 
!12Jli, peel it, and eat it. Through memory he has associated 
these doings w"~ th the yellowness. But does an ape see a banana, 
or yello~mess in a field of green which may be picked,_peeled, 
and eaten? Let us say the ape does not associate the gutteral 
sounds he makes with the yell_ovrness. To say that "several 
memories of the same thing have a single effect 11 i3 to say that 
s·everal .memories of' the s~e associated fac-t.s are associated with 
the sounds we make in the presence of those facts. The single 
effect is a name, and language originates in custom, habit, or 
convention and in a social context. 
In the fnllowing discussion of universals, however, Olson 
reve~ls another W8.Y of looking at how we come to ,assess knowledge 
of the world. He equates knm·'l edge of uni irersals with 1mowledge 
of "why flal"J.e (in gene~al) is hot" - o::.-, kro':.·.rled,1:;e "of the cause 
of the fac·c. 11 In this sche1"2e of -thi.ns~s to explain why fla"!le in 
general is hot is to explain why a particular flame is hot. So, 
the account is: 
(a) that-a-particular-flame-is-hot is a fact of sentience 
(b) that-flame-in-g;eneral-is-hot is a fact (individual) 
of experience, 
(c) why-flame-is-hot is a fact (universe.1) of science 
He wants to say that a snail, say, does in the :presence of a 
flame see the flame and feel its hotness, though it doesn't know 
(have any idea) ~.-,hat the flame or hotness is; that .an a:pe does 
see bananas, has repeated remembrances of particular bananas 
being yellow, though he cari.not say "banana II or tell ..,,,hy they are 
yellow; and that men can both say "that flame is hot" and know 
why it-is hot. 
they 
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101£.!£.., 
11 lli_!!., 
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p. 177. 
p. 178. 
doesn't 
general 
give the other causes, though I gather that 
be the same for each of the three branches 
of science. 
1301son, Aristotle's Poetics, p •. 178. 
141.!ui!.·, p. 179. 
151P.i9_., P• 180. 
16Ibid., p. 180-181. 
17Ibid., p. 181 • 
18Aristotle's definition of tragedy, therefore, fulfills 
three functions: 
(a) It captures in words the natur~ of tragedy. 
(b) It clarifies meanings. 
(c) It ,rovides the principle whereby an artist is to make, 
and a critic is to judge, a tragedy. 
It is a "real" definition, the first princi~le of a theory of 
tragedy, and a definition for the purpose of criticism all rolled 
into one. 
An internretation of Olson's account of how we acquire 
knowledge, consistent with the "power<-," of this definition, 
might run something like the follm,.ring: As he relates it, 
Aristotle's definition of tragedy is arrived at through in-
duction from particulars, and this inductive I"lethod of definition 
is in turn based unon a psychological account of how men 
acquire knowledge. 
Our senses give us information about the ·world.. They are 
"cha:nnels" through which information uasses from the world 
to us. Phis information takes the form of sensations (or 
sensible forms) which corres-pond to f2cts (factual forms) of 
objects in the world; "the knowledge provided by sensation is 
of the fact alone" ("that a particular flame is hot"). At 
this level of knowledge sensations co:rrespond to facts in the 
world, and both flame and hotness are inst::mces, as y~t unrelated, 
of facts. Sense perception is innate in all a..~imals, but in 
some sense-impressions come to persist because these ani:,_c;ls 
possess the faculty of memory. Through the memory, past sensa-
tions (facts) are associated with present ones, and "man is 
capable ••• of so unifying memory that several memories of 
the.same things have a single effect." This means that one 
eventually, through the memory, com~s to associate hotness with 
flame; and this association, regularly re,eated, cones to oe a 
"oneness." 1irnen one sees a -flame, one knows that it will be 
hot, without having to touch it. The knowledg8 i~hat flame is 
regularly accompanied by hotness produces the knowledge "that flame 
generally is hot." This ca!)::tci ty to relate and individ1.rnlize 
sensations (facts) "Aristotle c?lls empieria, exnerienc,e." 
"Eroerience is knowledge of individuals." 
But knowled_c;e of an individual is only kncrwledge of attributes. 
It :is conceivably, rr~-linguistic kno·:rledge. In the precP.nce 
of a flame, th-rough experience, one could know that it is hot 
without being able to say that it is hot. (With the· invent ion 
of langu2.ge, one would eventually be .able to noi~+, to a fl2-""1e 
and s 0oy, "That is a fla~e, don't tr:rnch it! It is hot! 11 - to a 
child perhaps.) Scientific knm·:ledge, hm·rever, is discursive and 
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"demonstrative"; it arises out of experience, from knowledge 
of the common attributes of individuals of these.me class. 
Scientific knowledge comes about because man is able 
intuitively to see the common forms of individuals in his 
sensible experience~ Intuition, however, precedes articulation, 
either articulation of the forms (universals or names) or of 
knowledge of the for!!ls. Intuitive cognition (recognition) 
is required for the invention of language; intuitive knowledge 
is prior to the possession of scientific knowledge, which is 
gained through demonstration and discourse. This means that 
one's cognitive intuition of a coI!lID.on form entails recognition 
of an individual's being in a form coI!lIIlon to other individuals, 
but does not necessarily entail (though such cognition is a 
requirement for) one's being able to articulate either the forn 
(name) or what the form is. (One may think the cow-form with-
out being able to say "cow.") TJitui ti ve knowlea.ge, however, is 
knowledge .Q.f fil fQ.m com.rnon to individuals of the same class 
(name); and possession of this knowledge enables one to articu-
late what the form is. Such articulation presu.pposes the invention 
of language (names). The articulation of this knowledge answers 
the question: 1fn.at do individuals called by _the same name (word) 
have in common? The general, concise form of this question is: 
What is X? The anm·rer will take the form of a definition which 
links the name (class or word) to the knowledge - something of 
the form, Xis so-and-so - and will serve to distinguish attributes 
common to individuals of the same class from those attributes 
peculiar to the individual. This knowledge of the common form 
makes scientific knowledge possible. (In order to discouse on 
a subject and to make true st2tements about it, one must know 
what it is he is talking about.) 
19Because the problems involved in Parts two and three of 
Olson's essay stem from those involved ·with the presentation of 
the general scientific method, I have chosen not to give separate 
accounts of what Olson says in these Parts but to inclua.e these 
accounts in my criticism. 
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201 have inserted "Purpose II as that which may be s~1.bsti tuted 
for the material cause of knowledge of facts; to complete the 
picture, as it were, though I don't know if this conpletion makes 
any sense. Call it an intuition: In Aristotle's (Olson's) scheme 
of things a rational purposive universe manifests itself in the 
facts (monads). 
21 1 don't mean to beg the question here. I just mean to 
point out that when one asks a man who claims to be an artist 
why he is able to do what he does - to articulate his rationale -
one doesn't always get a coherent account; sometimes the artist 
is unab'le to give an account at all. 
2201son, Aristotle's Poetics, p. 176. 
23If Olson were consistent, in saying "experience provides 
knowledge of the fact" he would be saying that the man of experi-
ence possesses scientific kno·wledge of facts. Possession of 
knowledge means that a person has intuited the causes. ~nis is 
to say that the man of experience would be able to say, 11Hotness, 
which is clearly a fact as facts are defined, is ••• (the four 
causes). 11 But only scientists are concerned with the causes of 
things. Therefore, it is either a contradiction in terms or an 
equivocation to say that experience (something prior to science) 
provides knowledge of facts, out not of the cause ~f the fact. 
2401son, Aristotle's Poetics, p. 179. 
25This is question begging. Is the subject an individual 
play or several plays, or is it tragedy in general? What does 
it mean to be concerned 11wi th what hannens e.l·ways or for the 
~ _;_ ..... t, 
most -i::,art" where the subject is an individual play? That Othello 
always kills DesdemonB.? No, unless the play is subject to the 
director's interpretation; in which case the play ceases to be 
an individ.1..1.al. One :must see that to speak of individuals is to 
contrast these with universals, that "individu.al 11 eets its 
meanine; here in contrast to "universal" which is the subject, or 
product, :produced and the concern of productive science. But 
upon seeing this, -th~ ind.1.J.cti ve !'art of science disa.ppears. 
-7-
26This makes inappropriate Olson's illustration of the 
rationale of productive science through analogy with shoe making. 
Olson says that the rationale of productive science is analogous 
to that involved in making a shoe: A form in the mind of the 
maker is imposed upon his medium. This is done, in the case of 
a shoe, by reasoning from the form (shoe-form) to be produced 
to the first thing or :part which can be produced, then making 
the shoe in reverse of this reasoning, cutting the necessary parts 
and stitching them together, until the composite of fo:rm and 
matter is produced. Here, to have scientific knowledge of shoe 
making,is to be possessed of a :pattern, but there is no talk 
of necessary ver~~s accidental attributes. 
Compare a Dair of penny loafers to a pair of white bucks. 
Both are pairs of shoes. Is the penny-hole of the penny loafer 
a necessary attribute of its being a shoe? ii1hat do all individual 
kinds of shoes have in common? When,· for ·what reason( s), would 
such a question be asked? 1:lh.en would one become involved in the 
quest for an essential pattern of shoe making? When would one 
ask any of the following questions: · 
(a) vlh.y is this shoe a shoe? 
(b) What is a shoe? 
(c) ~bat do all shoes have in common which makes them shoes? 
27The fact that men oftentimes make mistakes, or err, is not 
a sufficient reason for doubting ex::perience - at least not 
according to Olson's account of how ·we acquire knowledge - rather, 
a man must first entertain t11.e donbt, then noint to this fact to 
support his doubt. 
The man of eXDerience 1·rou1d not doubt that he knows what 
something is because .he makes mistakes or errs. He would be 
inclined to try to correct his riistakes; for instance, he would be 
inclined to rewrite a tragedy vrhich didn't quite co1"1e off. ReDeated 
failures would indicate a le.ck of ':?X9erience. This is to say 
that he would eqnate a lack of experience with a lack of knowledge. 
One might observe here that we are now leaving the psycho-
logical, and entering the social, context. 
2801son, A~istotle's Poetics, p. 183. 
29·The recognition of "tragedy" as a word implies, from the 
preceding anc.lysis, the follo·wing auestions: 
(a) Why is this word "tragedy" a word? 
(b) VJhat is a word? 
( c) What do alJ worc:ls have in cornmon which makes them words? 
The corresponding questions concerning the recognition of a play 
as a tragedy are: 
(a') 1,fay is this tragedy a tragedy? 
(b') 'What is (a) tragedy? 
(c') What do all tragedies have in corm:ion which makes them 
tragedies. 
The corres9onding questions concerning the recognition of a thing 
as a thing are: 
Etc. 
(a") Why is this thing a thing? 
(b") 'What is a thing 
(en) What do all things have in common which makes them 
things?· 
300lson, Aristotle's Poetics,?• lS8. 
3'1Ibid.,: p •. 188., 
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